Article on the reasons put forward by the CAA in its decision on Heathrow and Gatwick price controls to dismiss an argument by BAA that the cost of capital had wrongly been estimated on the basis of a geometric mean rather than an arithmetic mean.

The CAA's reasoning turns out to be invalidated by a fairly simple error. This is something of a surprise and a disappointment, especially as the CAA was one of the clients for the 2003 Smithers & Co study which, I thought, had clarified these issues.

I have a long-standing interest in electricity trading and settlement arrangements, and have been keeping an eye on the proposals arising from Ofgem's electricity cash out review.

My initial feeling was that P211 and P212 would probably lead to some sort of sticking plaster solution to reduce the vast amounts of cash currently flowing through the RCRC beer fund, without too much logic underpinning the outcome. But I am now seeing a prospect for a new approach that could lead to something better.

Electricity cash out: how we got here | viewpoint: Franck reviews where we are now. I hope that this analysis will be a foundation for getting to a better solution, i.e. a feasible, relatively simple, more direct and more effective way of delivering the purpose of trading arrangements with minimal costs and distortion of competition.

But the proof of the pudding will be in the writing. If it works then this article will be the first in a series on electricity trading.

UK competition authorities are sometimes accused of being slow. ORR deserves credit for bucking that trend with a three-week reaction to Passenger Focus' complaint about alleged excessive fares increases.

Passenger Focus did not like ORR's decision. This article has a look at what might happen next.

A little speculation about the competition law issues that might be raised by a new complaint about excessive UK rail fares.

Brief note on Ofgem's definition of total factor productivity in its gas distribution price control review document. The definition is taken from Wikipedia, with due acknowledgement, but it is so wrong that it raises doubts about the amount of care taken by Ofgem in developing its approach to making expenditure projections.

Article written immediately after reading Field J's judgment in EWS v E.ON to the effect that an exclusionary clause in a contract can be void (and bring the whole contract down with it) simply because one of the parties to the contract committed an abuse of a dominant position in imposing that clause. I was not convinced by the reasoning in the judgment. Irrespective of the merits of the E.ON/EWS case, it seems to me that the logic relied upon by the judge could, if left unchallenged, be a dangerous precedent.

This article reacts to some aspects of recent consultations by the DTI and Scottish Executive on possible changes to the renewables obligation schemes in the UK. The article notes that these latest proposals finally reveal the true nature of the renewables obligation as a simple tax-and-subsidy scheme, rather than a cap-and-trade scheme, and questions the practical arrangements (why not get HMRC to administer it?) and the chances of State aid approval.

Article prompted by reports that the Scottish National Party opposition spokesman Jim Mather MSP has complained to the OFT about allegedly excessive charges being levied by Scottish Water on business users; and by a suggestion from WICS, the regulator, that some of Scottish Water's trade effluent charges infringe competition law because they are too low as a result of transitional caps set by Scottish Water to avoid imposing very sharp increases in charges.

The article focuses on the question of how Mr Mather's complaint about exploitative abuse might be substantiated, and considers whether the caps on increases in charges that WICS objects to are indeed a further abuse, or whether they are better seen as part of Scottish Water's special responsibility not to abuse its dominant position by imposing excessive price increases.

Article in The Register about the High Court judgment in Metha v J Pereira Fernandes SA on the application of the Statute of Frauds and Perjuries 1677 to e-mail messages. In short, the sender's name or initials as a signature in the body of the e-mail can be a valid signature, but names or addresses that appear only in the headers do not count. The article kindly links to me as the source of a tip about this case.

Update, 14 April 2006: Ian Grigg of Systemics points out that this ruling is bad news for digital signature suppliers, but good news for the rest of the world. He is right: the application of old tried-and-tested principles produces more sense than attempts at changing the law (in this case on evidence) to match changes in technology (in this case cryptography).

A little rant for the road, about bias and incompetence in DG Information Society's approach to "interactive policy making" in the context of the IPv6 version of the Internet Protocol.

This is a follow-up on the question of mitigation of market power in the future single electricity market for the island of Ireland, commenting on the regulators' proposals for mitigation through the imposition of restructuring contracts.

The Office of Fair Trading wants to get involved in the analysis of the compatibility of State aid with Article 87 of the EC Treaty, and has produced a short bid and a long bid offering its services to the European Commission and to UK providers of State aid. This article reviews the OFT's proposals.

Declaration of interest: Reckon LLP offers advisory services in this area. But we try to apply the law as it is rather than invent some new regime, and are therefore probably not in the same market as the OFT.

In a return to a more technical fare, this article speculates about how Article 82 might apply to the reported dispute between mobile phone handset manufacturers and patent holder Qualcomm, and in the case for annulment of the "Losec" infringement decision brought by AstraZeneca against the European Commission.

Story involving Amanda Holden, a phone box, the Office of Fair Trading, the Control of Misleading Advertisement Regulations and Article 81. Also a regrettable lapse into informality of this normally very serious blog.

This article was prompted by an entry in The Becker-Posner Blog on US State laws against "price gouging". Both Becker and Posner argue that these laws, which seek to restrict excessive price increases in emergencies such as natural disasters, are misguided. Is the prohibition of exploitative excessive prices under Article 82 the equivalent provision in EC and UK law, and, if so, how well might it measure up against the arguments presented by Professor Becker and Judge Posner?

Brief article in French prompted by a report in the French newspaper Le Monde pleading poverty on behalf of the French Conseil de la concurrence, and drawing attention to comparisons with the UK's OFT in an apparent attempt at justifying greater powers, and more money, for the Conseil.

I have been impressed by the relative clarity of Conseil decisions on Article 82 cases (certainly compared to the work of the OFT and the UK regulators with concurrent powers), so it would take some evidence to convince me that making the Conseil more like the OFT would be a good idea. Did the article provide such evidence? Emphatically not: the data used by Le Monde in its comparison with the OFT turn out to be less than robust.

This article provides a brief nit-picking commentary on the ORR's decision under the Competition Act 1998, Article 81 and Article 82 that Portec Rail Products, a supplier of trackside lubricators, had not infringed competition law by refusing to carry out compatibility testing with its new lubricator for a lubricant promoted by XL Lubricants, part of NTM Sales and Marketing.

This web article is a commentary on a consultation document on the regulation of market power in the future single electricity market for the island of Ireland. The consultation document sets out "to help identify the issues relating to market power that might affect the all island market and in particular the [single Irish electricity market], and to consider appropriate regulatory remedies that might be developed to address those concerns". I argue that it fails to achieve this objective.

Brief notes on my experience with the "Creative Industries discussion forum" launched last week by the DCMS to "hear your opinions about any creative industries-related issue or event which you think is important" (in the words of James Purnell MP, Minister for Creative Industries and Tourism).

(Updated 25 July 2005.)

Some notes and comments on a lecture by Philip Lowe, the Director General of Competition at the European Commission. The lecture was wide-ranging, reviewing recent and foreseeable developments in DG Competition's implementation of EC competition law; but the main interest was clearly in the "review" of Article 82 and potential Article 82 guidelines.

This web article arose from my addition of entries for buyer power concepts to our Glossary, in an attempt to clarify — in my mind and for readers — the precise meaning of this phrase in the context of competition economics.

The main thrust of the article is that "buyer power" can refer to two different concepts. "Countervailing buyer power" is the power of a buyer to create or reveal competition on the other side of the market. "Buyer market power" is market power in buying arising from the lack of effective competition between buyers. This may seem fairly obvious, but somehow a lot of rubbish seems to get written in "economic" studies of competition by confusing these two concepts.

Am I missing something? You can add comments online or e-mail me.

This web article is a critical commentary on Ofwat's decision in a Competition Act 1998 case involving the transport and treatment of leachate from landfill sites. Ofwat found that there was no case for United Utilities and its subsidiary Bioprocessing to answer in connection to allegations of margin squeeze and abusive denial of access made by Quantum Waste Management, an independent waste disposal business. I was not entirely convinced by some aspects of the reasoning set out in the decision.

Notes from a lecture by Dr Andreas Bartosch of Haver & Mailänder on the assessment of State aid to public services following the Altmark judgment, which provided a useful alternative perspective on some of the issues discussed on my previous article on public services and competition law.

I have come across quite a bit of controversy recently about the interactions between competition law and public services, and the impact of competition law on the role of the State. This somewhat lengthy web article tries to recapitulate the basics of what the law is and whether it imposes any surprising restrictions on State action, and discusses whether the guidelines produced by the UK competition authorities on this topic, including the draft guidelines on application to the railway sector (which are under consultation until Monday 20 June 2005) are successful at explaining it.

Notes from a lecture by Professor Eleanor M. Fox of the New York University School of Law on "Refusal to deal: a right or a wrong? Trinko, IMS and Microsoft".

An interesting lecture on the nuances of EC and US laws on the rights and wrong of refusing to assist dependent competitors.

Ofgem put out a press release yesterday announcing the implementation of the "interim" incentive scheme for financial incentives for interruptions on the National Grid transmission network on which it published final proposals in December.

This is the scheme with an effective incentive rate of just under £40,000 per MWh (£40 per unit), and various other questionable incentive effects. (See my earlier comments on the initial proposals and on the final proposals.)

Neil Collins rightly comments in the Daily Telegraph that "the result [...] will be overinvestment in the network, and increases in costs which far outweigh the possible inconvenience saved".

This article questions whether the hybrid approach mapped out by the regulator Postcomm for the liberalisation of postal services in the UK, combining the accelerated introduction of competition with the continuation of retail price controls, is a good way of gaining the benefits of competition without jeopardising the interests of consumers.

A brief commentary on Ofgem's final proposals for transmission reliability incentive schemes, following on from my post on the initial proposals back in October.

This web article provides some reactions to Ofwat's response to the Competition Commission's draft guidelines on water mergers.

This web article discusses Ofgem's consultation document "Electricity transmission network reliability incentive schemes: initial proposals".

This web article discusses pricing aspects of Ofwat's consultation on draft guidance for water undertakers' access codes under new provisions for bulk supply and common carriage introduced by the Water Act 2003.

This Reckon article argues that the Competition Commission's draft guidelines on water mergers risk focusing too much on the value of comparators to Ofwat

The paper (4 pages, PDF) argues that there are other effects which ought to be considered, including the potential lessening of competition in markets for corporate control; the risk that an unduly restrictive approach to merger control could itself impede competition in markets for corporate control; and the value of comparative information to the industry (and ultimately to consumers) over and above its value to Ofwat.

This Reckon article considers the scope for challenging Apple's apparent decision not to license its digital rights management (DRM) technology FairPlay to competitors of the iTunes Music Store.

Drawing on the ECJ's guidance in the recent IMS case, we consider (4 pages, PDF) the conditions under which EC competition law (Article 82) may require Apple to license FairPlay to other retailers of music downloads to enable head-to-head competition in the supply of downloadable music content to iPod users.