Competition Commission's view of rail-on-rail competition

Commentary (PDF, 7 pages) by the Competition Commission on the approach that might have been adopted by the group responsible for the aborted FirstGroup/Intercity East Coast merger inquiry to assess the impact of the merger on competition and prices. The paper focuses on point-to-point flows on which there is direct competition between rail operators, and proposes filters to restrict consideration to major flows on which there is "effective price competition", a concept which it characterises by the existence of a material share of revenues from non-inter-available tickets. It also suggests an analysis of "profit incentives" for the merged operator in order to assess the scope for profitable price increases or service reductions.

For further information or advice please contact Franck Latrémolière.

Filed under Competition Commission, Merger control, Public transport.

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